The Unbearable Rightness of Auer
Cass R. Sunstein† & Adrian Vermeule††
For more than seventy years, courts have deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations. The Auer principle, as it is now called, has
attracted academic criticism and some skepticism within the Supreme Court. But
the principle is entirely correct. In the absence of a clear congressional direction,
courts should assume that because of their specialized competence, and their greater
accountability, agencies are in the best position to decide on the meaning of ambiguous terms. The recent challenges to the Auer principle rest on fragile foundations, including an anachronistic understanding of the nature of interpretation, an
overheated argument about the separation of powers, and an empirically unfounded
and logically weak argument about agency incentives, which exemplifies what we
call “the sign fallacy.”

INTRODUCTION
Agencies issue countless regulations and, using the standard
interpretive tools,1 courts sometimes find them ambiguous. What
is the appropriate methodology for resolving such ambiguities?
There are two basic answers. The first, offered by longstanding law,2 is that the agency’s own interpretation generally
prevails, with certain case-specific exceptions that we will discuss.3 The second,4 currently supported by a minority coalition
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†† Ralph S. Tyler Jr Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. We are
grateful to Ron Levin, John Manning, Arden Rowell, David Strauss, participants at a
Harvard Law School faculty workshop, and participants at a University of Chicago symposium for valuable comments, and to Evelyn Blacklock and Maile Yeats-Rowe for superb research assistance. Parts of this Essay significantly expand and revise, while
drawing on, a section of a near-contemporaneous, and much longer, article, Cass R.
Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative
Law, 2015 S Ct Rev 41. We are grateful for permission to draw on that section here.
1
Because of our focus on Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997), we are bracketing
here the question exactly what these are, but people are in broad agreement on them.
There are disputes, of course, about (for example) the role of text, purpose, and avoidance
of absurdity.
2
See id at 461; Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co, 325 US 410, 413–14 (1945).
3
See Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1208 n 4 (2015) (listing
qualifications to Auer deference).
4
For the seminal article, with a host of original and ingenious arguments that appear to have inspired the attack on Auer, see generally John F. Manning, Constitutional

297

298

The University of Chicago Law Review

[84:297

on the Supreme Court (or perhaps only by Justice Clarence
Thomas), is that judges must resolve the ambiguity without deference to the agency’s view.5
Sometimes long-standing law is right, and the best answer,
by far, is the first. It reduces both the costs of decision and the
costs of errors. It greatly simplifies the task of interpreting regulation; it also reflects a sensible understanding of institutional
competence (as the second palpably does not). The resolution of
ambiguities often involves complex issues of fact and value.
Agencies, and not judges, should be settling those issues.
The argument in favor of independent judicial judgment reflects an emerging, large-scale distrust of the administrative
state, even—in some quarters—a belief that it is constitutionally
illegitimate.6 In our view, that belief is utterly baseless.7 But
even if it is not, the appropriate response is hardly to say that
judges, with their own institutional weaknesses and potential
biases,8 should make the judgments that are entailed by resolving ambiguities in regulations. If taken seriously, general arguments from the separation of powers and general arguments
about the constitutional illegitimacy of the administrative state
would sweep far more broadly than the relatively modest problem of deference to agency interpretation of agency regulations.
If taken seriously, those arguments would have radical implications for delegation, the combination of functions in agencies, and
other fundamental features of the modern administrative state.
There is a grave mismatch between the heavy constitutional
artillery and the idea that when some word in a regulation
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum L
Rev 612 (1996).
5
See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1213–25 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). There are
actually two different versions of the alternative to Auer deference: either no deference,
or so-called deference after Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 139–40 (1944). Justice
Antonin Scalia seemingly preferred the former, see note 34 and accompanying text,
while Professor John Manning argues for the latter, see Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at
618, 686–90 (cited in note 4). We discuss the Skidmore alternative at notes 86–89 and
accompanying text.
6
See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 12 (Chicago 2014). See
also Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 S Ct Rev 41, 42–43.
7
For a legal defense, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From
Law’s Empire to the Administrative State (Harvard 2016). For a historical defense, see
Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred
Years of American Administrative Law 312 (Yale 2012).
8
See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823, 825–26 (2006).
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admits of more than one interpretation, courts should be able to
make the choice.
Our basic goal here is to defend the first answer, known in
the world of administrative law as the Auer principle, after a
unanimous decision for the Court written by the late Justice
Antonin Scalia in Auer v Robbins.9 In the process, we identify
three reasons why a strand of the contemporary legal culture
finds that principle jarring, in a sense even unbearable. The first
involves anachronistic but influential understandings of what
interpretation actually entails. Even in the aftermath of legal
realism, some people believe that the interpretation of ambiguities calls for purely legal skills—as it plainly does not. Here we
follow Scalia, Auer’s author, who insisted—at least until very
late in his career—that interpretation necessarily includes consideration of policy consequences, and of the institutional roles
that best serve to allocate responsibility for policy consequences.
The second reason involves the heavy constitutional artillery, applied in a context in which it does not belong and without
regard to its far larger implications. In some ways, the issue of
Auer deference appears to be a stalking horse for much larger
game—namely, a wholesale critique of the administrative state.
The constitutional critique of Auer rests on generalities about
the separation of lawmaking from law execution and law interpretation. If applied consistently, those generalities would require declaring unconstitutional dozens of major federal agencies. The theory of the administrative state, for better or for
worse, is that so long as separation of powers operates at the top
level (Congress, presidency, judiciary), there is no general problem if the top-level institutions decide to create lower-level
agencies that exercise combined functions. And in any event, it
is quite clear that those agencies do not mingle or combine constitutional powers at all. So long as they act within and under a
legislative grant of statutory authority, everything they do
amounts to an exercise of “executive” power, including both the
making and interpreting of rules, as Scalia emphasized for the
Court as recently as 2013.10
The third reason involves an intuitively appealing, but wildly
unrealistic, understanding of the incentive effects of Auer.
Invocation of those incentive effects is a reflection of a pervasive

9
10

519 US 452 (1997).
See text accompanying notes 53–55.
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error within the economic analysis of law, which is to identify
the likely sign of an effect and then to declare victory, without
examining its magnitude—without asking whether it is realistic
to think that the effect will be significant. This error deserves its
own name; we call it “the sign fallacy.”
As a matter of methodology, the three reasons share a similar defect. They invoke large abstractions—about the identification of meaning, about separation of powers, about agency incentives—to resolve a concrete puzzle for which such
abstractions are either misplaced or unhelpful. The same defect
can be found in many disputes about how judges should proceed;
the Auer controversy is only one example.
I. CASES AND PROBLEMS
To see the wide range of cases to which Auer is relevant,11
consider the following:12
1. The facts of Auer itself: An agency must decide whether
police captains and sergeants are eligible for overtime under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. The statute contains an exemption from overtime for “executive, administrative, or
professional” employees.13 Binding regulations, enacted with
notice and comment, say that such employees must be paid
on a “salary basis,” the antonym of piecework. The regulations further say that if pay is “subject to” being adjusted for
quality, it is an indicator of piecework. The problem then
becomes this: police captains might have their pay docked if,
after internal affairs proceedings, they are found to have
committed disciplinary infractions, such as maltreating a
11 Here and throughout, we assume that the agency’s interpretation of its own legislative regulation either was enacted through notice-and-comment procedures in its own
right, or else falls within a valid exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking under
§ 553(b)(3)(A) or (B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (the exceptions for interpretive
rules, procedural rules, general statements of policy, or legislative rules as to which
there is “good cause” for dispensing with notice and comment). 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(A)–(B).
We thereby bracket and set aside any claim that the agency’s interpretation was procedurally defective; our focus is strictly on the substantive validity of the interpretation.
Although Chevron deference to agency interpretation of statutes is partly tied to the procedures agencies use to enact their interpretations, see United States v Mead Corp, 533
US 218, 229–30 (2001), in the Auer setting the law rejects that approach. Indeed, agencies may receive deference even for interpretations set forth in appellate briefs. See, for
example, Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 564 US 50, 59 (2011).
12 In these hypotheticals, we draw on actual cases but deviate from them in minor
ways.
13 29 USC § 213(a)(1).

2017]

The Unbearable Rightness of Auer

301

suspect.14 Does that possibility make them “subject to” adjustment for quality of work? What if the captains were
never actually fined, but could be? How should the agency
interpret the “subject to” language in the regulation?
2. An agency issues a legislative rule requiring employers
to report occupational diseases within two weeks after they
are “diagnosed.” An employer asks the agency to clarify
what counts as a “diagnosis.” The agency answers, in an interpretive rule, that chest x-rays that “score” above a specified level of opacity count as a diagnosis.15
3. An agency issues a regulation that imposes federal tariffs on “diaries” and “bound books.” In an interpretive rule,
it announces that “diaries” include daily journals, but not
calendars, and that “bound books” refers only to formal
bookbinding.16
4. An agency issues a legislative rule that exempts “waiting
time” from the requirements of its overtime regulations. In
an interpretive rule, it says that certain emergency services
employees are engaged in “waiting time,” rather than
“working time,” if they are not required to perform jobrelated tasks, even if they have to be accessible by phone
and available to come into work on ten minutes’ notice.17
5. An agency issues a rule requiring swimming pools at hotels to be “fully accessible” to people who use wheelchairs
through “lifts,” which make pools easy to use. In an interpretation, issued in a public document,18 the agency makes

14

See Auer, 519 US at 455–56.
See American Mining Congress v Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F2d
1106, 1107–08 (DC Cir 1993).
16 See Mead, 533 US at 221–25.
17 See Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 135–36, 139 (1944).
18 In accordance with existing law, we are understanding Auer to apply not only to
“interpretative” rules within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC
§ 553(b)(3)(A), but also to a broad class of agency interpretations, so long as they are authoritative and do not fall within certain exceptions we will discuss later. See Perez v
Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1208 n 4 (2015) (listing limited qualifications and exceptions to Auer deference). Six justices (including the chief justice and Justice Anthony Kennedy) joined the opinion in Perez and its important footnote 4, suggesting that a clear supermajority of the Court is, as of now, willing to accept Auer subject to
qualifications. Perez, 135 S Ct at 1202. Further evidence is supplied by United Student
Aid Funds, Inc v Bible, 136 S Ct 1607 (2016), a certiorari petition that asked the Court to
overturn Auer, but that was denied, with Justice Thomas the lone dissenter. See id at
1608–09 (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari).
15
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it clear that to qualify, a lift need not be a permanent part
of the pool. It can be mobile and simply available to those
who ask.19
At least since Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co,20 decided
in 1945, the Supreme Court has said that so long as the legislative regulation is genuinely ambiguous, courts should defer to
reasonable agency interpretations.21 But if we emphasize a presumption in favor of private ordering, we should be able to see
an immediate objection, which would move the law in significant
new directions.22 The regulation sets out the law, and it is binding. But within the constraints of the law, regulated classes are
authorized to do whatever they like. In the cases above, the
agency’s interpretation is essentially irrelevant, because the legislative rule has given the regulated classes (some) room to maneuver. No additional constraints can come from the agency’s interpretation, which would effectively amend the legislative rule
by imposing further restrictions.
Consider the swimming pool regulation. If the department
has not banned hotels from using portable lifts, then they are
entitled to use portable lifts. It is unlawful to add a requirement,
through interpretation, that the legislative rule lacks. Perhaps
many cases in which agencies seek to benefit from the Auer principle should be resolved against the government, on the theory
that if agencies have not expressly regulated private conduct
through a legislative rule, the matter is at an end. But suppose
that a regulation is genuinely unclear. If so, the question remains: Who interprets it, court or agency? Does the agency’s
view deserve some weight?
II. DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES: WHAT DOES CONGRESS WANT?
Suppose that Congress expressly grants HHS the power to
interpret ambiguities in its own regulations—or expressly denies
it that authority. That direction should be authoritative subject

19 But see Questions and Answers: Accessibility Requirements for Existing Swimming Pools at Hotels and Other Public Accommodations (DOJ, May 24, 2012), archived
at http://perma.cc/2ACJ-V2HV (discussing this issue but coming out the other way via
“Questions and Answers”).
20 325 US 410 (1945).
21 Id at 413–14.
22 This approach is a close cousin to that defended in Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983), which, in our view, similarly rests on a presumption in favor of private ordering. See id at 552.
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of course to any constitutional constraints, which we will discuss
shortly. The resulting question is simple: Has Congress in fact
exercised that authority, either globally or in particular statutes?
The justice who was both Auer’s author and (late in his career) its leading judicial critic, Justice Scalia, believed so. He
pointed to § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act23 (APA),
which states that “the reviewing court shall . . . interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”24 In his view, the
APA therefore “contemplates that courts, not agencies, will authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations.”25
But as Scalia was aware, that conclusion raises a serious problem, which is that it would require rejection of the wellestablished Chevron principle26 itself, on the ground that it
defies the APA. Scalia tried to rescue that principle as “in conformity with the long history of judicial review of executive action,”27 even though it is apparently in tension with the APA (at
least on the view Scalia is endorsing). By contrast, his reasoning
seems to run, Auer must be rejected on the ground that the APA
forbids it—and no such long history justifies it.
But this argument moves far too quickly. Does the text of
the APA really require independent judicial interpretations of
law? If so, it would seem to repudiate any “long history,” which
would therefore be irrelevant. On many approaches to interpretation, a long history, preceding enactment of a contrary text,
cannot overcome that text, so long as the text is sufficiently
clear. Perhaps Scalia believed that the APA is not clear (as we
shall suggest); but he seemed to think that it is.
In other writings, however, Scalia offered a different justification of Chevron, one that (in his view, as expressed in those
writings) does not violate any statute or threaten the separation
of powers. The question is what the APA commands, and the
statement that the court shall “interpret” questions of law is not
decisive in favor of independent judicial review, if it is also the
case that under organic statutes, the correct interpretation of law

23

60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5.
5 USC § 706.
25 Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
26 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837,
842–45 (1984).
27 Perez, 135 S Ct at 1212 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
24
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depends on the agency’s interpretation of law.28 If an organic
statute says “source (as defined by the EPA),” then the law is
what the agency says (so long as the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable, and subject to constitutional constraints). But suppose that Congress has not said anything explicit but has generally given an agency the authority to issue regulations. Has it
also given the agency the authority to interpret ambiguities in
the underlying statute? If so, then the law is, to that extent, what
the agency says it is—and in faithfully applying the APA, the reviewing court had better say so. On this view, courts do not violate the APA by deferring to reasonable agency interpretations;
such deference just is, itself, part of the law that courts declare.29
But when exactly should judges conclude that Congress has
indeed given agencies interpretive authority? Scalia saw that as
a difficult question, answered in Chevron by a (good) legal fiction, one that is superior to the legal fiction that preceded it. His
explanation warrants quotation at length:
An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires:
(1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear
about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency. When
the former is the case, what we have is genuinely a question
of law, properly to be resolved by the courts. When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of discretion
upon the agency, and the only question of law presented to
the courts is whether the agency has acted within the scope
of its discretion—i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity
is reasonable. . . .
. . . If the Chevron rule is not a 100% accurate estimation
of modern congressional intent, the prior case-by-case evaluation was not so either—and was becoming less and less
so, as the sheer volume of modern dockets made it less and
less possible for the Supreme Court to police diverse application of an ineffable rule. And to tell the truth, the quest
for the “genuine” legislative intent is probably a wild-goose
chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I expect that
Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant
28 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev
1, 6 (1983).
29 See id. Here, too, we do not necessarily mean to endorse this justification for
Chevron, only to elicit its implications for the Auer question.
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to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn’t
think about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then
any rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional,
presumed intent, and operates principally as a background
rule of law against which Congress can legislate.
If that is the principal function to be served, Chevron is
unquestionably better than what preceded it.30
We think that this argument, relying on “a fictional, presumed
intent,” is essentially correct, so long as it is understood that the
choice of fiction depends on the consequences of adopting one or
another. And the reasons that such an instruction should be
deemed best are principally consequentialist reasons Chevron
itself gave, involving the agency’s comparative competence with
respect to fact-finding and policy-making,31 and its comparative
political accountability.32 When a statute is unclear, and especially when a complex modern regulatory statute is unclear, resolution of the ambiguity will inevitably require policy-making
competence—which courts lack and which agencies have.33 In
1989, Scalia emphasized that precise point as well.34
III. AUER’S HOUR
Which brings us directly to Auer. Nothing in the APA either
endorses or rejects Auer, at least in express terms. As we have
30 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L J 511, 516–17.
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U Pa L Rev 1607,
1608–11 (2016).
32 See Chevron, 467 US at 865–66. There are other considerations in support of
Chevron. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of
the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L
Rev 1093, 1121 (1987).
33 See Sunstein, 164 U Pa L Rev at 1608–09 (cited in note 31). Note, however, the
interesting qualification in King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480 (2015), stressing that in extraordinary cases, involving issues of great economic and social significance, the presumption should be reversed, and Congress should be presumed to want independent
judicial judgment. See id at 2488–89. For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 236–42 (2006).
34 See Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 516–18 (cited in note 30). There is a competing
view, which would invoke background principles of separation of powers, and perhaps
concerns about agency self-dealing, to generate a different presumption. See Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
Colum L Rev 452, 456 (1989). See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 394–95 (1986) (suggesting a multifactor balancing
test). In our view, Scalia’s position in 1989 is essentially correct. For discussion, see
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo Wash L Rev 347, 358
(2003); Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 202–05 (cited in note 33).
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noted, courts are instructed to “determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,”35 but perhaps Congress has said, in general or in particular cases, that the meaning of a regulation turns on the agency’s interpretation of its
meaning, where ambiguity exists. In that case, courts fulfill
their duty to “determine the meaning” by deferring to that view.
If so, courts might say that where legislative rules are ambiguous, the law is what the agency says it is (for example, through
an interpretive rule).
It is true that just as in Chevron, Congress has not issued
any such express instruction. But it has not issued a contrary
instruction either. In this field, any rule again “represents merely
a fictional, presumed intent”36 that must be defended as the best
instruction to attribute to the national legislature. As others have
noted, the best and most straightforward defense of Auer—as a
rebuttable presumption about implicit legislative instructions as
to the allocation of interpretive authority—rests on the same arguments that Justice Scalia adduced to justify Chevron.37
In that light, Auer itself might be defended in two different
ways.38 The first points to the agency’s comparative epistemic
advantage as an interpreter. Perhaps the agency has the best
understanding of what the underlying legislative rule actually
meant. (Of course this assumes a particular, controversial theory
of interpretation; but let us bracket that question for the sake of
discussion.) If an agency uses the word “diagnosis,” it is in the
best position to know what it had in mind. In some cases, this
rationale is indeed an exceptionally strong point for Auer, at
least when the agency has issued an interpretive rule in relatively close temporal proximity to the legislative rule. (It might
well work in the swimming pools case above, and it would work
as well for a number of interpretations issued in the aftermath
of legislative rules under the Affordable Care Act.) But when an
agency has changed its interpretation, this particular argument
35

5 USC § 706.
Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 30).
37 See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, Hearing on HR 4768 before the
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 13 (May 17, 2016) (“Testimony of Ronald M.
Levin”) (statement of Ronald M. Levin, William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of
Law, Washington University in St. Louis), archived at http://perma.cc/UA66-V28C
(“[T]he strongest justifications [for Auer] run parallel to the pragmatic justifications for
Chevron.”).
38 For helpful discussion, see Matthew C. Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler, Seminole
Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo Wash L Rev 1449, 1454–57 (2011).
36
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will not work. And in many cases, an agency will not be uncovering an antecedent intention. It will be interpreting a term on
which it had not previously focused. (That might well be true of
the diagnosis case above.)
A second defense of Auer points not to the agency’s epistemic
advantages as an interpreter, but to its comparative advantages
as a policy-maker. On this view, interpretation of ambiguous
regulations is really an exercise in policy-making, at least much
of the time. A regulatory term like “subject to” calls for further
specification in a diverse array of cases, an exercise that in turn
requires judgments of policy. Agencies have technical expertise
as well as political accountability, and so long as a regulation is
ambiguous, it should be “interpreted” by them (policy should be
made by them), not by courts, which lack those advantages.
To be sure, the “traditional tools of statutory construction”39
can be used to determine whether there is ambiguity at all. But
where there is genuine ambiguity, the agency has comparative
policy-making advantages—precisely parallel to its advantages
in the Chevron setting. Just as, on Scalia’s view in 1989, Chevron is the best fictional default rule for statutory construction, so
too Auer is the best fictional default rule for interpretation of
agency regulations.
In 2013, Scalia objected that “the purpose of interpretation
is to determine the fair meaning of the rule,” and “[n]ot to make
policy.”40 In 1989, by contrast, Scalia had rightly observed “that
the traditional tools of statutory construction include not merely
text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the consideration of policy consequences.”41 In his later account, agency
enactments must be taken “as written,” thus giving “the Executive [ ] a stable background against which to write its rules and
achieve the policy ends it thinks best.”42 We have argued that
even if the 2013 view is correct, Auer is justifiable in a range of
circumstances.
In any event, however, for the reasons stated by Scalia in
1989, the 2013 view is not correct. And on Scalia’s 1989 view,
Auer is not at all inconsistent with the point, which it does not

39 Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 843
n 9 (1984).
40 Decker v Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S Ct 1326, 1340 (2013)
(Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 515 (cited in note 30) (quotation marks omitted).
42 Decker, 133 S Ct at 1340 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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contest, that regulations must be taken as written. Scalia’s 1989
discussion shows that Auer is right for the same reason that
Chevron is right: where Congress has not been clear, deference
to the agency, in the face of genuine ambiguity, is the best instruction to attribute to it.
IV. CONCERNS
Critics of Auer, including Justice Scalia in his later years,
have several independent concerns. All of them raise significant
questions about methodology.
A.

Incentives

On one view, Auer creates an unfortunate and even dangerous incentive for agencies, which “is to speak vaguely and broadly,
so as to retain a ‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with
retroactive effect.”43 Auer therefore encourages opportunistic behavior: agencies will issue vague, broad regulations, knowing
full well that when the time comes, they will be able to impose
the interpretation they prefer.
In the abstract, the concern is certainly intelligible. With
Auer, agencies can know that they will have the benefit of being
able to clarify ambiguities; without Auer, they would not have
that benefit, and might therefore speak precisely. But the idea
that Auer results in motivated and nefarious obscurity—“a dangerous permission slip for the arrogation of power”44—strikes us
as a phantasmal terror. Indeed, we are unaware of, and no one
has pointed to, any regulation in American history that, because
of Auer, was designed vaguely and broadly.45 There is no reason
to believe that the magnitude of the posited incentive is substantial. We are dealing here, at best, with the sign fallacy.
No one should deny that such a thing might occur. Many
things might occur. But in deciding on the optimal level of clarity
and specificity, agencies have a wide range of incentives, cutting
in different directions, and the most important of these have
nothing at all to do with Auer. Internal pressures often create an
43 Decker v Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S Ct 1326, 1341 (2013)
(Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44 Id (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 In nearly four years in the federal government, one of us (Sunstein) dealt with
well over two thousand rules, and he never heard even a single person suggest, or come
close to suggesting, that a regulation should be written vaguely or ambiguously in light
of Auer, or so that the agency could later interpret it as it saw fit.
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incentive toward clarity, so that everyone inside government
knows what the regulation means. External pressures often cut
in exactly the same direction, with multiple requests for clarity
from the regulated sector. To be sure, external and internal
pressures might also call for deliberate ambiguity (though we
believe that this is far less common). But when ambiguity exists,
it is rarely, if ever, because of Auer.
After all, few people who are involved in writing regulations
think a great deal about Auer; many of them have absolutely no
idea what Auer is. A recent study finds that Auer was less wellknown to agency drafters of regulations than Chevron U.S.A. Inc
v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,46 Skidmore v Swift &
Co,47 and United States v Mead Corp;48 drafters themselves knew
about Auer only about half of the time.49 It is most unclear that
even the half that know Auer think seriously about it when they
are writing regulations.
There is a further point, which counts as a fundamental objection to the claim that Auer creates perverse incentives. In an
important way, Auer actually incentivizes clarity, and eliminating it would eliminate that incentive. If an agency leaves a regulation ambiguous, it cannot be certain that a subsequent interpretation will be made by an administration with the same or
similar values. For agencies, ambiguities are a threat at least as
much as they are an opportunity. One administration might well
want to ensure that its successor will not be allowed, with the
aid of Auer, to shift from a prior position. We do not press this
point, because doing so would commit the sign fallacy (with a
different sign). Our only suggestion is that those who think Auer
is wrong, because of the incentive problem, might have the sign
wrong. There are multiple incentives cutting in multiple directions, and their net magnitude is at best unclear.
There is a palpable lack of realism, and a lack of empirical
grounding, to the widespread concern that Auer is a significant
part of the constellation of considerations that lead agencies to
speak specifically or not. We do not believe that agencies often
preserve ambiguity on purpose—in fact we think that that is highly unusual—but when they do, Auer is hardly ever, and possibly
46

467 US 837 (1984).
323 US 134 (1944).
48 533 US 218 (2001).
49 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan L Rev
999, 1061–66 (2015).
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never, part of the picture. The critics speak abstractly of possible
abuses, but present no empirical evidence to substantiate their
fears.
B.

Separation of Powers

Auer’s critics have a more fundamental objection, one that
involves heavy artillery,50 and that also has intuitive appeal: the
decision produces a constitutionally suspect combination of the
power to make law with the power to interpret law. Quoting
Montesquieu, Scalia insisted that this is a serious problem, because when “legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person . . . there can be no liberty.”51 He concluded: “He
who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”52 At least
Chevron preserves that separation, because agencies interpret
what Congress enacts, but Auer obliterates it, because agencies
interpret what agencies enact. Or so the argument runs.
But this critique of Auer is both unsound and too sweeping.
There are four critical points. First, the traditional and mainstream understanding in American public law is that when
agencies—acting within a statutory grant of authority—make
rules, interpret rules, and adjudicate violations, they exercise
executive power, not legislative or judicial power. Executive power
itself includes the power to make and interpret rules, in the
course of carrying out statutory responsibilities.53 Hence there is
no commingling of functions within agencies in the first place;
any talk to the contrary is loose and imprecise. The Court recently and emphatically reiterated this point, through the pen of
. . . Scalia:
[T]he dissent overstates when it claims that agencies exercise “legislative power” and “judicial power.” . . . The former
is vested exclusively in Congress, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, the
latter in the “one supreme Court” and “such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” Art. III, § 1. Agencies make rules (“Private cattle may
be grazed on public lands X, Y, and Z subject to certain conditions”) and conduct adjudications (“This rancher’s grazing
50

See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 654 (cited in note 4).
Decker, 133 S Ct at 1341 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ellipsis in original).
52 Id at 1342 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53 See United States v Grimaud, 220 US 506, 521 (1911) (noting that statutory authority to make administrative rules is a grant of executive power, not legislative power).
51
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permit is revoked for violation of the conditions”) and have
done so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities
take “legislative” and “judicial” forms, but they are exercises
of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be
exercises of—the “executive Power.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 1.54
This understanding rests on a long-standing theory of the
nature and scope of executive power—what has aptly been
called the “completion” theory, in the context of presidential
power.55 When agencies make rules and interpret law in the
course of executing their statutory grants of authority, they are
carrying out or completing a legislative plan—“carrying [it] into
Execution,” to adapt the words of the Constitution.56
Nothing in that activity amounts to an exercise of legislative
or judicial power, properly speaking. Of course there is a separate question here about the validity of the underlying grant of
authority, which must contain an “intelligible principle” to avoid
an invalid delegation of legislative authority.57 But the constitutional critique of Auer is different from, and tangential to, the
delegation issue; the former is meant to apply even when the
grant of statutory authority is straightforwardly valid under the
nondelegation doctrine.
Our second point is that the separation-of-powers critique of
Auer, and of the combination of rulemaking and ruleinterpreting functions, is pitched at the wrong level. The separation of powers is fully satisfied so long as the principal institutions set out in the Constitution—Congress, president, and judiciary—exercising their prescribed functions, devise and approve
the scheme of agency authority that combines rulemaking and
rule-interpreting power in the agency’s hands. Whatever reasons
make the constitutional separation of powers attractive in turn
support that combination of functions. If the constitutional institutions, operating as they were set up to operate, have decided
that such an arrangement is both valid and wise, then respect for
the separation of powers counsels approval of the arrangement.
54 City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communications Commission, 133 S Ct 1863,
1873 n 4 (2013).
55 See Jack Goldsmith and John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power,
115 Yale L J 2280, 2282 (2006).
56 US Const Art I, § 8. The idea behind the clause is actually helpful, by analogy.
Just as Congress makes laws to “carry into execution” its powers granted by higher (constitutional) law, so too agencies make rules to carry into execution their powers granted
by higher (statutory) law.
57 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co v United States, 276 US 394, 409 (1928).
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Conversely, there is no constitutional rule that each and every
subordinate body set up by the constitutional institutions must
itself have the same internal structure as the Constitution of
1789, in some oddly fractal way.
Third, bracketing our earlier points, there is a severe mismatch between the sweeping constitutional critique, on the one
hand, and on the other the exceedingly narrow context of Auer,
where agencies are merely sorting out ambiguities in their own
rules. If the combination of lawmaking and law-interpreting
functions in agencies really is constitutionally suspect as such,
then there are much larger problems than Auer to discuss. The
combination of functions in agencies is a hallmark of the administrative state, so the FCC, FTC, SEC, and a myriad of other
agencies would seem to be constitutionally suspect as well; all of
these agencies write binding rules, bring enforcement actions,
and adjudicate violations, in the course of which they interpret
the very rules that they themselves have made.
Justice Thomas seems to think that these agencies have to
go. But it is clear that Scalia, the “faint-hearted originalist,”58
would never have gone so far. And the Court as a body has repeatedly said that the combination of functions is not in itself a
constitutional problem.59 In the Auer setting the quite modest
combination (for example, in defining the term “diagnosis”), if
that is what it is, seems especially trivial, de minimis.
If correct, therefore, the constitutional critique actually
amounts to an indictment not merely of Auer, which seems at
most a minor detail, but of much of the contemporary administrative state. Its proponents should have the candor to argue for
it on those terms. Perhaps those proponents, or some of them,
believe that the constitutionality of agencies that combine lawmaking with law interpretation is too entrenched to deserve rethinking, while Auer is fair game. But is it really a good or even
intelligible use of the separation-of-powers principle to insist
that judges must, entirely on their own, interpret the meaning of
words like “diagnosis” or “diaries”? Does constitutional liberty
depend on an affirmative answer?
Fourth and finally, it is a simple confusion to suggest an
agency could ever “delegate power to itself.” Agencies just have
whatever quantum of power they have, under relevant statutory
58

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849, 864 (1989).
See, for example, Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 54 (1975); Marcello v Bonds, 349
US 302, 311 (1955); Federal Trade Commission v Cement Institute, 333 US 683, 702 (1948).
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grants of authority; whether they exercise that power through
legislative rulemaking, adjudication, guidances, interpretations,
or whatever, the quantum of power itself is unaffected. Judges
can always enforce the outer boundaries of the agency’s grant of
authority, however it is exercised, whether through statutory interpretation or through arbitrariness review.
What is really at stake in the Auer setting is not agency selfdelegation of power, and certainly not the expansion of power,
but rather timing—the timing of the exercise of whatever statutory power the agency otherwise has.60 When an agency makes
valid legislative rules, those rules bind the agency itself as well
as all the world. The more specific the rule, the less future discretion the agency has when interpreting the rule; the less specific the rule, the more future discretion the agency enjoys to
flesh out the rule by means of guidances, interpretations, and
adjudicative orders. Again, the overall quantum of statutory
power is not expanded but instead allocated between present
and future.
Put differently—and this is the way administrative law puts
it—the agency’s choice is to allocate its authority between more
general rulemaking now and more specific interpretation or adjudication later.61 The more content the agency supplies through
legislative rulemaking now, the less content it will have to supply (or indeed be able to supply) through issue-specific interpretation or case-specific adjudication later.
It then becomes clear that the Auer issue that Scalia attempts to describe as an issue of self-delegation is really just a
version of the familiar administrative law question of agency
discretion to choose between policy-making forms or policy instruments.62 And the law’s answer—at least since Securities &
Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp63 (“Chenery II”) in 1947,
and continuing throughout the modern era—has been that
agency discretion to make procedural choices is extremely broad

60 For valuable discussion, see Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105
Georgetown L J *4–7 (forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7FN2-GCEH.
61 For a discussion of the close connection between Auer and agency choice between
rulemaking and adjudication, see Testimony of Ronald M. Levin, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at
16–18 (cited in note 37).
62 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U Chi L Rev
1383, 1384–85 (2004).
63 332 US 194, 201–03 (1947).
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and subject only to the constraints of arbitrariness.64 In the
standard Auer case, there is nothing at all arbitrary about the
agency’s decision to specify, through interpretation, what a legislative rule means, not least because the agency is often answering a question that it did not anticipate.
C.

The Thomas Critique

Thomas has recently offered a somewhat different objection
to Auer, also constitutionally grounded—and as we will see, its
implications are even more sweeping. In his view, Auer “subjects
regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers
sought to prevent,” and so it is “constitutionally suspect.”65 It is,
after all, the power of courts to issue authoritative interpretations in judicial proceedings. The critical problem with Auer is
that it substitutes the agency’s power of interpretation for that
of the courts: “Because the agency is thus not properly constituted
to exercise the judicial power under the Constitution, the transfer of interpretive judgment raises serious separation-of-powers
concerns.”66 Congress may not delegate “binding” interpretive
power to agencies construing their own regulations, because as a
constitutional matter Congress does not possess the “judicial
power” in the first place, and therefore cannot give it away.
Thomas’s theory at least has the virtue of novelty. But the
problems that afflict it are so many, and so transparent, that
one stares puzzled at Thomas’s opinion—can it really mean
what it seems to be saying? Agency interpretations are only as
“binding” as the underlying legislative rules or statutes themselves; their force is entirely derivative. Thomas thus fails to explain why agencies’ interpretation of their own regulations
should be thought to count as “binding” at all.
As the Court emphasized in Perez v Mortgage Bankers
Association,67 courts retain the ultimate authority to decide
whether the agency’s interpretation is correct;68 in that sense the
agency binds no one. And if the agency’s interpretation really
has binding legal effect, then it may be vulnerable on procedural
64 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Bell Aerospace Co, 416 US
267, 293–95 (1974).
65 Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1213, 1215 (2015) (Thomas
concurring in the judgment).
66 Id at 1220 (Thomas concurring in the judgment).
67 135 S Ct 1199 (2015).
68 See id at 1208 n 4.
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grounds if created without notice and comment.69 Thomas seems
to be working with some unarticulated, and perhaps indefensible, conception of the distinction between interpretation and
lawmaking. Like the academic work on which Thomas draws,70
his view “largely elides the line-drawing problem posed by any
attempt to distinguish interpretation from legislation.”71
In any event Thomas’s theory sweeps far beyond agencies’
interpretation of their own regulations, to include any “binding”
agency interpretation at all, including agency interpretations of
organic statutes themselves when those interpretations are
deemed binding. The theory would therefore bar not only Auer
deference, but also Chevron deference itself, even if explicitly required by Congress—here too an outcome that is congenial to
Thomas, but almost certainly not to Scalia.
Let us end with the Court’s recent, simple, emphatic, and
powerful response to criticisms of Auer: when the underlying
regulation is clear, the agency must comply, and it is ultimately
up to the judges to decide when the regulation is clear.72 It is instructive in this regard to compare the critiques of Auer with
parallel arguments in City of Arlington, Texas v Federal
Communications Commission73—written by Scalia in 2013. City
of Arlington upheld the authority of agencies to determine,
through statutory interpretation, the scope of their own “jurisdiction,” within the bounds of statutory ambiguity74—an abomination to the traditional legal mind, and a holding that prompted
vehement objections from the chief justice in dissent.75
For agencies to do as City of Arlington authorized, the dissent
argued, would strengthen the “potent brew of executive, legislative, and judicial power”76 that agencies already mix together.
(Again, however, let us be clear that the Court has consistently
69

See id at 1204.
See generally Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (cited in note 6).
71 Gary Lawson, Book Review, The Return of the King: The Unsavory Origins of
Administrative Law, 93 Tex L Rev 1521, 1545 (2015). See also Adrian Vermeule, Book
Review, No, 93 Tex L Rev 1547, 1560–61 (2015).
72 See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4 (“Even in cases where an agency’s interpretation
receives Auer deference, however, it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given
regulation means what the agency says.”).
73 133 S Ct 1863 (2013).
74 See id at 1868.
75 Note, however, that the chief justice took a narrower approach, asking exactly
what Congress had delegated, and did not argue in favor of carving out jurisdictional
judgments as such. See id at 1877 (Roberts dissenting).
76 Id at 1886 (Roberts dissenting).
70
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held that agencies implementing statutory grants of authority
always and only exercise executive power, which includes subsidiary powers to make and interpret rules.)77
Scalia’s reply was strong and straightforward:
The fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by
establishing an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency
decisionmaking that is accorded no deference, but by taking
seriously, and applying rigorously, in all cases, statutory
limits on agencies’ authority. Where Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where
Congress has established an ambiguous line, the agency can
go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.78
But this argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to Auer deference
equally well. The putative separation-of-powers problem with
the combination of lawmaking and law-interpreting power in the
same hands—the fox put in charge of the henhouse—is exactly
the same in both the Auer setting and the setting of agency selfdetermination of “jurisdiction.” And the remedy Scalia proposes,
judicial enforcement of clear texts, is the same as well.
It is not as though there are no checks on agencies built into
the Auer framework. Indeed there are several:79
1. Judicial enforcement of clear regulations and statutes.
First and foremost, the regulation that is being interpreted,
if otherwise valid, provides the law, and any interpretation must
comply with it. The regulation itself must also comply with the
underlying statute, and its enactment must be procedurally valid.
Judges, not anyone else, decide whether these requirements are
satisfied.
2. Arbitrariness review.
As the Court also emphasized in Perez, the “most notable”
constraint on agency decision-making is “the arbitrary and capricious standard,” which serves to promote “procedural fairness” by
requiring agencies to give good reasons for their procedural

77

See Grimaud, 220 US at 517–21; City of Arlington, 133 S Ct at 1873 n 4.
City of Arlington, 133 S Ct at 1874.
79 For a discussion of possible limitations to Auer deference, partly (but only partly)
overlapping with the limitations in current law, see Stephenson and Pogoriler, 79 Geo
Wash L Rev at 1466–1503 (cited in note 38).
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choices—and, of course, for their interpretations.80 But this is
not a general objection to Auer deference as such; it is an inquiry
to be carried out in particular cases.
3. Reliance, consistency, and arbitrariness.
An agency interpretation might be arbitrary and capricious
because it defeats reliance interests without adequate explanation.81 Indeed, interpretations that are inconsistent over time82
may be disqualified from receiving Auer deference at all.83 Here
too, however, the notions of reliance and consistency support no
general objection to Auer. They are qualifications that do not entail or presuppose any doubt about the validity of deference in
the normal case.
4. The antiparroting canon.
Where an agency issues a binding regulation (perhaps
through notice and comment) that merely “parrots” the language
of the underlying statute, and then interprets the regulation rather than the statute, Auer deference does not apply.84 This is
best understood as a corollary of the completion theory of executive power;85 an agency engaged in completion should add some
80

Perez, 135 S Ct at 1209.
See id. See also Encino Motorcars, LLC v Navarro, 136 S Ct 2117, 2125–26
(2016); Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 US 502,
515–16 (2009).
82 Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 512 US 504, 515 (1994) (“[A]n agency’s
interpretation of a . . . regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is entitled to
considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.”) (quotation marks
omitted).
83 See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4 (collecting qualifications). The same note also alludes to the possibility that Auer deference might not apply “when there is reason to
suspect that the agency’s interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
judgment.” Id, quoting Christopher v SmithKline Beecham Corp, 132 S Ct 2156, 2166
(2012). This last point is a well-established qualification to the Court’s periodic practice
of affording Auer deference even to agency interpretations contained in briefs and other
litigation-related documents. See, for example, Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell
Telephone Co, 564 US 50, 59 (2011) (stating that the Court “defer[s] to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations, even in a legal brief,” unless there is some “reason to suspect
that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question”). The issue of deference to agency litigating positions is tangential to
the questions we address. The examples we have given all involve interpretations issued
during agency proceedings, not post hoc rationalizations generated during litigation, and
the major criticisms of Auer, based on the separation-of-powers and agency incentives,
are not cabined to the latter class of situations.
84 See Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 257 (2006).
85 See Goldsmith and Manning, 115 Yale L J at 2282 (cited in note 55).
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specification, some content, to the underlying statute, or its action has accomplished nothing and counts for nothing.
***
So there are a range of qualifications and checks on Auer deference, under current law. The alternative to full judicial review
of agency interpretations is hardly unchecked administrative
power; it is a cabined regime of partial and qualified deference.
D. The Skidmore Alternative?
Scalia’s own view seems to have been that the alternative to
Auer deference was no deference at all—de novo judicial interpretation of agency regulations.86 On a different view, there is an
appealing compromise: independent judicial interpretation of
agency regulations would be a bad idea (for reasons we have
sketched), but Auer confers too much discretion on agencies, and
so the right approach is based on “Skidmore deference.” In theory,
Skidmore opts for “persuasive” rather than “authoritative” deference. It looks to “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s]
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”87—a kind
of intermediate type or level of deference, which does not
amount to the abdication that is Auer.88
The simplest answer to this question is that there is no
problem to be fixed. Nothing is broken. However, assuming
there is a problem, Skidmore is not a better solution, for several
reasons. Scalia’s view, which rejects the Skidmore alternative
altogether, is theoretically uncompromising, whereas the Skidmore alternative seems to flinch from the logic of the very arguments the critics adduce to undermine Auer. After all, if agencies interpreting their own regulations are engaged in a kind of
constitutionally illegitimate self-dealing that results from the fusion of lawmaking and law-interpreting power, why should their
claims be given any sort of deference at all? The more consistent

86 See Testimony of Ronald M. Levin, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 16–17 (cited in note
37). See also Decker, 133 S Ct at 1342–44 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (rejecting Auer and then interpreting a regulation de novo, without reference to
Skidmore).
87 Skidmore, 323 US at 140.
88 See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 686–90 (cited in note 4).
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approach would be to treat such claims as tainted by their illegitimate origin, and to ignore them altogether.
Furthermore, the line between Auer deference and Skidmore deference is thin even in principle and often invisible in
operation; in general, it is of far more interest to administrative
law teachers than to actual judicial practice. How often would
courts strike down an agency interpretation under Skidmore but
uphold it under Auer?89 We suspect not very often. In any case,
is it really worthwhile to renovate a doctrine that has worked
reasonably well for decades in order to substitute a standard of
review that is, at most, marginally less deferential than current
law? Increases in legal complexity have their place, but this is
not one of them.
E.

A Pragmatic Perspective

There is something overheated, wildly disproportionate,
about the separation-of-powers critique of Auer. Return to the
cases with which we began. Is constitutional liberty really at
risk if an agency is allowed to interpret the phrase “subject to”
or the word “diagnosis,” within the bounds of textual meaning?
“Bound books”? “Diaries”? Is liberty less at risk if, in the face of
ambiguity, courts, composed of generalist judges, interpret such
terms on their own? Does it matter that agency interpretations
often increase, rather than confine, the freedom of the regulated
class, by telling its members that they may in fact do what they
want to do? Does it matter that in hard cases, judicial interpretation of ambiguities often entails political judgments, as reflected in the conspicuously and predictably different views of
Republican and Democratic appointees, even under Chevron?90
Does it matter that we are typically speaking of interstitial and

89 In Christopher, the Court concluded that in a case involving legitimate reliance
interests, Skidmore, and not Auer, would provide the appropriate standard. However,
the Court deemed the agency interpretation unpersuasive even under Skidmore, which
reinforces our impression that in most cases the two standards yield the same conclusions; the difference between Auer and Skidmore usually makes no difference. See
Christopher, 132 S Ct at 2168–70. See also Gonzales, 546 US at 268–69 (rejecting Auer
deference and then finding an agency interpretation unpersuasive under Skidmore). And
in any event Perez, which lays out a framework for approaching questions of deference to
agency interpretations of regulations, makes no mention of Skidmore. See Perez, 135 S
Ct at 1208 n 4.
90 See Miles and Sunstein, 73 U Chi L Rev at 825–26 (cited in note 8); Cass R.
Sunstein and Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 Duke L J 2193,
2202 (2009).
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highly technical judgments, in which agencies understand an
ambiguous term (“diaries”) in a linguistically permissible way?
In our view, the strongest objections to Auer are not largescale constitutional abstractions. The strongest objections are
instead pragmatic. They suggest, far more modestly, that when
an agency is interpreting its own regulations, the best legal fiction is that ambiguities are for courts, not administrators, to resolve. On this view, it would be possible to approve of Chevron
but to disapprove of Auer, contending that if those who write
laws (regulations) can also interpret them, there is a risk of bias.
If we distrusted the agency’s competence or expertise, or believed that it was systematically biased, and if we thought that
judges could be better trusted to resolve questions that often involve policy judgments, we might deliberately choose to indulge
the fiction that Congress means to have courts, rather than
agencies, resolve ambiguities in agency regulations. Some version of that essentially pragmatic view may underlie the opposition to Auer, which nonetheless is expressed in constitutional
terms.
But return to the cases with which we began, and ask
whether a judgment about institutional competence really justifies the conclusion that the relevant ambiguities are always best
resolved through independent judicial judgment. Law is full of
situations in which judges review the work of potentially biased
experts (in part because bias and expertise sometimes come as a
package); but the risk of bias is just one factor among many, and
will sometimes or even often be outweighed by the advantages of
deference. Because of the need to resolve technical issues, and
because of the plain advantages of accountability, the balance
cuts hard in the direction of Auer.
The law’s usual response to such situations is not to substitute judicial judgments for agency judgments wholesale, but to
examine at retail the reasons that experts give for their policy
choices—which is why the Perez Court both reaffirmed Auer,
and yet also emphasized the role of arbitrariness review in monitoring agency choices, in particular cases.91 In any event, as we
have suggested, the fear that agencies will seek to expand their
own authority depends on a mistaken factual predicate, indeed a
naïve picture of what agency interpretations of their own rules are
for. Indeed, one of the primary functions of such interpretations
91

See Perez, 135 S Ct at 1208 n 4, 1209.
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has been to confine agency authority rather than to expand it, often in response to questions and concerns from the regulated
community.
Auer in effect allows agencies to clarify how they intend to
exercise their discretion, without fear of judicial second-guessing
(within the limits of relevant ambiguity). It accommodates the
many agencies that respond to the questions and concerns of
regulated parties by saying that the agency does not mean to invade, and has no intention of invading, the private sphere in the
relevant way. So long as the underlying regulation is ambiguous, and the agency is interpreting it, it would hardly be better
for courts to second-guess agency judgments on this count.
CONCLUSION
For more than seventy years, courts have deferred to agency
interpretations of ambiguous regulations. In the absence of a
clear congressional direction, courts have assumed that because
of their specialized competence, and their greater accountability,
agencies are in a better position to decide on the meaning of ambiguous terms. That assumption is correct.
The contemporary challenges to Auer rest on three weak
foundations: a question-begging argument about the APA; unhelpfully abstract and overly sweeping rhetoric about separation
of powers; and an unrealistic (and somewhat fearful) claim
about agency opportunism, exemplifying the sign fallacy. The
best approach to agency regulations is simple: Use the conventional tools of interpretation, and if ambiguity remains, the
agency’s interpretation prevails.92
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